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Abstract
The proliferation of ethnic militia organisations in Nigeria raises questions about
the factors responsible for the development. Although reasons adduced from the
rhetoric of these organisations point to the politics of exclusion and marginalisa-
tion in Nigeria, this form of ethnicity is a new phenomenon. The growth of these
militant formations pervading the length and breadth of the country is attributable
to the nature and character of the Nigerian state. Perceptions of marginalisation in
the distribution of power and resources, and the repressive tactics of the state to
sub-national dissent, have encouraged their growth. The Movement for the Actu-
alization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Oodua Peoples
Congress (OPC) are prominent ethnic militia groups that draw membership from
major ethnic groups in southern Nigeria. Rivalry and hegemonic competition for
the control of the state among the major ethnic groups led to a civil war in the late
1960s, but wartime experiences were not harnessed for a nation-building project.
The result was the systematic perversion of the state, which has resulted in
throwing up new forms of ethnicity in Nigeria as reflected in the emergence of
these organisations.
Introduction
The proliferation of ethnic militia organisations in Nigeria raises questions
about the factors responsible for the development. Though reasons adduced
from the rhetoric of these organisations point to the politics of exclusion and
marginalisation in Nigeria, this form of ethnicity is a new phenomenon. The
growth of these militant formations pervading the length and breadth of the
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country is attributed to the nature and character of the Nigerian state. Since its
creation by British colonialists in the nineteenth century, the Nigerian state has
sought to maintain control and hegemony through the use of violence. This
tendency has beclouded attempts at addressing the Nigerian national question,
which is the core of the festering divisive ethnicity besetting the country (Asia
2001). It became more profound during military rule when violence was
unleashed on civil society groups, thus closing channels of peaceful expression
of dissent in the country. The result was the transformation of civil society
groups into ethnic organisations, which employed the use of violence not only
to counteract the state but also to advance their objectives (Adekson 2004). The
most prominent of these militia organisations include the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Oodua
Peoples Congress (OPC), which both draw their recruits from the two major
ethnic groups in the southern part of the country. What are the socio-political
conditions responsible for this development? This article examines this question
by comparing MASSOB and the OPC.
The Perverse Nigerian Polity
One striking feature of the Nigerian state is ethnic diversity, which has defined the
tone of its politics (Nnoli 2008). About 250 ethnic groups and 400 linguistic
groups are indigenous to Nigeria (Aluko 2007). The action of the colonialists to
merge these disparate groups and cultures into one political entity created a
nation-building problem for the post-independent administrations (Asia 2001).
The administrative style of the colonialists compounded the problem by encour-
aging identity and ethnic division as a strategy for entrenching their foothold in the
country. For instance, the colonial policy of indirect rule localised politics and
prevented cross-cultural political interaction among the Nigerian groups, thus
making suspicion the hallmark of inter-ethnic relations (Ekeh 1996). This was not
helped by the nature of the colonial economy, which supplanted the self-sufficing
subsistence economy and created the condition of competition for the limited job
opportunities offered by the modernisation process along ethnic lines.This state of
affairs engendered the emergence of communal associations as a social security
fodder for the rising number of migrants who flooded into the urban centres for
succour (Nnoli 2008:101–26).
These communal organisations would later become the springboard for political
parties, including two of the major pre-independence parties: the Northern Peo-
ple’s Congress (NPC), which evolved from ‘JamiyyarMutanemArewa’, a cultural
organisation dominated by the Hausa-Fulani people in 1949, and theAction Group
(AG), which evolved from ‘Egbe Omo Oduduwa’, a cultural organisation of the
Yoruba ethnic group in 1951. The emergence of these parties increased ethnic
consciousness and turned the politics of decolonisation into contests for ethnic
superiority. It was the rivalry and bickering between these ethnically based politi-
cal parties that led to the demise of the first republic following the military coup
d’état in January 1966. That intervention of the military polarised the institution
along ethnic lines, as a section of the military interpreted the action of their
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colleagues as ethically motivated. This created the condition for a counter coup six
months later that degenerated into a civil war between the former eastern region
and the rest of the country.
The civil war has been interpreted variously, both as a war of unity and an act of
persecution, depending on what side of the divide the analysis belongs. One
analysis sees the Biafran secessionist movement as a fight for justice, which was
aborted by the superior might of the federal military government supported by
foreign powers whose interests were to secure a managed condition for economic
exploitation in Africa (Amadiume 2000:42–44). The remote causes of the war
could be traced to events that occurred five years immediately preceding the war.
Some of these events included the intense political uprisings and violence that
erupted across the country. Fearon and Laitin (2006:5) recorded 124 of such
instigated riots. Most of the victims of the riots were Igbo people living in the
northern parts of the country where the killings were more pronounced and
coordinated. The attacks were prompted by the fear of Igbo domination, especially
after Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and five other majors of Igbo extraction staged a
coup in which prominent northern political leaders were killed. The policies of
General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo who took over the reins of power, especially the
promulgation of Decree 34 that attempted to abolish Nigerian federalism in place
of a unitary system, heightened fear in the north. The counter coup in July 1966
that ushered in General Yakubu Gowon as the head of state turned the table in
favour of the north and triggered further attacks against the Igbo in the north. Onu
(2001:9) estimates that about thirty thousand easterners were killed in the north,
and another 1.8 million were forced back to the east as refugees in 1967. The
central government’s failure to stop the pogrom or bring the perpetrators to justice
sparked reprisal killings in the east and the justification of the decision of the
region to secede from the federation. The declaration of the former eastern region
as the Republic of Biafra was premised on the argument that the Nigerian state
could not guarantee the security of the Igbo and other easterners. This was
aggravated by the over-stretching of the then eastern regional government capacity
to handle the massive influx of refugees displaced from other parts of the country
by the pogrom and the inability of the federal military government to stop the
attacks.
Guided by events of the immediate post-independence experience, military
administrators who dominated governance attempted to consolidate nation-
building on the bequeathed legacies of colonialism by stifling political mobilisa-
tion along ethnic lines. To achieve this, they introduced principles that combined
elements of federalism and consociationalism as a panacea for Nigeria’s unity.
Some of these actions included the creation of states from the four it inherited in
1966 to thirty-six when Nigeria transitioned to democracy in 1999. The rationale
was to weaken the federating units so as to prevent the re-occurrence of Biafra.The
military also incorporated the principle of federal character in the Nigerian
constitution, recognising ethnic and regional affiliation as the basis of appoint-
ments, recruitment, and promotions in federal institutions and agencies. This
principle sacrifices merit and does not promote hard work and patriotism in public
service (Oyovbaire 1983:19; Suberu 2001:111).
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The implementation of this policy has by no means achieved the intended unity
of the country, but instead worsened the structural imbalance of the Nigerian
federation, activating latent centrifugal forces in places where it was hitherto
dormant and adding strain on the polity (Mustapha 2007:17). This has been
reflected in the many ethno-religious riots and communal clashes that washed over
the entire country under the fourth democratic dispensation (Ginifer and Ismail
2005:10; Ploughshares 2004). The consequence of this inter-ethnic strife is deep-
ening mistrust among the Nigerian ethnic groups and weakening of governmental
institutions (Aluko 2007:35). These factors made the Nigerian space ripe for
ethnic rivalry, abuse of human rights, mistrust of government, corruption, unem-
ployment, and pervasive poverty, all of which feed on deep frustrations, creating
divisiveness and promoting violent attitudes that have given rise to a new form of
ethno-nationalism manifesting in Nigeria since the late 1990s (Duruji 2008).
Economic Factors and State Failure in Nigeria
The global economic crisis of the 1980s was very significant in creating the
conditions for the new form of ethno-nationalism that arose in the 1990s in
Nigeria. The resultant decline in oil revenue and mismanagement of resources by
unaccountable military elites plunged the country into an economic crisis that
left its trail of social consequences that partly contributed to this new form of
ethno-nationalism (Duruji 2010). The severity of the crisis compelled the gov-
ernment to implement an economic reform programme premised on stabilisation
and adjustment, which was supervised by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. This reform consisted of liberalisation, privatisation, deregula-
tion, and the removal of subsidies, all of which were ideas aimed at scaling down
the state’s role in the economy. The effects of these policies were reflected in the
collapse of local industries and the decline in the capacity of the industries that
survived, including rising costs of business in vital energy and power sectors.
The consequent shrinking of economic opportunities and mass unemployment
created a large army of frustrated people. The socio-economic condition of this
class made them vulnerable and ready tools in the hands of elites with parochial
objectives.
The economic crisis signalled an expansion in criminality such as armed
banditry, political assassinations, and the use of thugs during electoral contests.
The inability of the Nigerian state and its persistent failure to respond to these
vices forced a large section of the populace to resort to self help (Obi 2004). That,
of course, shows the failure of the state as manifested in its inability to guarantee
the security of its citizens. The poor performance of the Nigerian police in the
maintenance of security has been attributed to a myriad of deficiencies in that
institution, including recruiting, training, and budgetary problems (Bach 2006).As
a result, the dependence of the people on the government for security is low, and
this explains the increasing privatisation of security and widespread vigilantism at
the personal and community levels, respectively (Fabiyi 2004; Obasi 2002). These
private security units transform into ethnic militias and quickly consolidate as
champions of ethno-national interests (Obasi 2002).
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The Nigerian state was originally designed by the colonialists to prop up
inter-ethnic rivalries in order to promote the interests of the colonialists (Uzoigwe
1996).As such, the structure and form of the Nigerian state continue to sustain the
relationship of inter-ethnic distrust and rivalry, which has transformed into dimen-
sions where use of violence by groups challenging its legitimacy is prevalent
(Duruji 2008; for an explanation of the reasons behind the predominance of the
ethnic group over the state in Nigeria, see Ekeh 1996). The ethnic group that
controls the state uses its power and economic resources to protect the material
interests of its own people. Institutionalisation of this state of affairs promotes
economic and political hierarchies, exacerbated by deliberate policies of ethnic
exclusion and alienation, which make resistance inevitable. The OPC and
MASSOB emerged as part of that resistance by ethnic groups asking for a fair
share in the Nigerian polity.
The Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC)
The OPC emerged in 1994 as a response to Ibrahim Babangida’s military admin-
istration’s annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election of which Moshood
Abiola of the Yoruba extraction won. The annulment was interpreted by many
Yoruba people as furthering an agenda of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elites to
maintain their power monopoly in Nigeria (Adejumobi 2002; Faseun 2005). The
annulled election, which would have completed the transition programme of the
Babangida military administration, was seen as one too many by a cross-section of
politicians who had suffered the same fate in the course of the long transition.
Abiola, who believed he won that election, was able to deploy his financial clout to
rally these politicians to vehemently oppose the annulment. The repressive
response of General Babangida and later General Sani Abacha drove these ele-
ments into the trenches. The OPC therefore was created as a counterforce against
an ambitious military class perceived to be furthering a Hausa-Fulani ethno-
regional agenda (Babawale 2004). In Faseun’s ownwords, the OPCwas formed ‘to
defend, protect and promote Yoruba interests and to ensure that justice is done to
other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria’ (Faseun 2008).
The OPC’s definition of Yoruba interests has been transformed radically from
the posture at the inception of the organisation, especially since the country
transitioned to democracy in 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo, who was of Yoruba
extraction, emerged as the president. Obasanjo benefited from the understanding
among the elites to concede the position of president to theYoruba ethnic group as
a way of pacifying them over the injustice of the annulled election of 12 June 1993.
But this notwithstanding, the OPC leaders had sustained the popularity of the
organisation by refocusing it towards providing social services to its communities.
Since the overwhelming membership of the organisation was part of their com-
munities, it could respond to the problems of the people more effectively than the
state (Fabiyi 2004). The organisation is attested to have relative success in fighting
crime. For instance, the OPC’s involvement in the provision of security stems from
the fact that crime is a huge concern inYoruba land as it is for the rest of Nigeria
(Alemika and Chukwuma 2005). The operational style of the OPC is the instant
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liquidation of arrested criminals. This action is hinged on the perception of the
police as unreliable in the prosecution of criminals (Guichaoua 2006; 2007).
The involvement of OPC members in dispute settlement has also ensured the
acceptability of the group by its public. This is made possible given the hurdles
encountered by ordinary Nigerians in formal processes of dispute settlement;
traditional alternatives provided by the OPC thus become an easy choice.The OPC
has gained tremendous legitimacy in these areas through its meticulous arbitration
of landlord and tenant issues and collection of debts, among others (Okechukwu
2000). The success of the OPC has transformed the organisation into ‘an informal
actor regulating Yoruba society . . . facilitated by the identity of its local leaders,
who generally share many other affiliations as members of traditional secret
societies called oro (Nolte 2004), or members of labour unions’ (Guichaoua
2006:14). Other populist activities of the OPC include defending the interests of
workers who have been threatened with dismissals from their workplaces (Omole
2005), as well as the delivery of social services especially where formal state
institutions have failed (Guichaoua 2006:14). Its success in these endeavours is
attested to by a wide spectrum of the people, which has made the organisation
relevant in post-transition Nigeria (Okechukwu 2000). Members of the OPC are
recommended as vigilantes in its areas of influence, returners of stolen goods to
their owners, and mediators between conflicting parties (Nolte 2004). Though
prices for these services are not fixed, the beneficiaries pay depending on the social
status of the parties to the transaction. The local OPC leaders see these avenues as
lucrative because of the percentage that accrue to them (Faseun 2008). However,
the booty that is gained from the provision of these services is not appropriated
solely by the members or their immediate officers; the national body of the OPC is
entitled to 10% of whatever fees are paid to these individuals (ibid.). These
lucrative activities have kept the OPC relevant and attractive to recruits despite the
fact that the issue that informed the formation of the movement was resolved in
1999 by the election of a Yoruba man to the presidency.
The intrumentalisation of the OPC by local politicians, which was alluded to by
Fredrick Faseun while referring to the activities of Chief Gani Adams’ faction of
the organisation, has kept the organisation relevant in the post-transition to civil
rule period (Faseun 2008). Faseun’s grouse with Adams is premised on the use of
the OPC as mercenaries to service the inordinate ambitions of politicians, whereas
Adams accused Faseun of collecting bribes from candidate Obasanjo in exchange
for the OPC’s support of his candidacy. This is contrary to the ideological
disposition of the organisation for a radical restructuring of the country before the
handover to a democratically elected government.
The bitter rivalry and supremacy contests between the Adams and Faseun
factions of the organisation, which lasted for close to nine years, resulted in several
violent clashes (Akinyele 2001). Several meetings called by prominent Yoruba
leaders, including monarchs led by the Oni of Ife, to reconcile the two factions did
not yield a positive outcome until Gbenda Daniels, then the governor of Ogun
state, intervened in 2007 to bring some modicum of peace. He succeeded in
prevailing upon Adams to recognise Faseun as the founder and leader of the
organisation, while the position of national coordinator was conceded to him. The
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interests shown by prominent Yoruba elites in the unity of the organisation
demonstrate acceptance of the OPC. The use of the organisation as a social
pressure groupmakes them relevant in the post-transition period. On this score, the
OPC has not disappointed Yoruba elites. Its ability to intervene in political
wrangling involving them at the national and local levels has been demonstrated.
Examples include the dispute between Obasanjo’s presidency and the National
Assembly led by SenatorAnyim PiuosAnyim and Representative Ghali Na’Aba in
2003 when Obasanjo was threatened with impeachment. Another example is the
political dispute between Governor Gbenga Daniel and the Ogun state House of
Assembly. On both occasions, the politicians had to toe the line of the OPC.
The robust relationship between the OPC and Yoruba elites emboldens the
group to stage violent actions, some of which were to defend perceived interests of
theYoruba against other groups. Such examples include OPC meddlesomeness in
the Ilorin chieftaincy conflict between the Afonja and Fulani ruling families, the
Sagamu inter-ethnic clash between the Yoruba and the Hausa, the Ketu-Mile 12
market disturbance between the Hausa and Yoruba, and the Apapa Warf dock
workers conflict between the Igbo and Yoruba. In all of these disputes, the OPC
intervened to support the Yoruba against other groups. Some of these violent
actions, which led to the loss of lives and property, inadvertently helped the OPC
to consolidate its support base among Yoruba-speaking people. These actions
present the OPC as the liberator of the Yoruba ethnic group (Nolte 2004). The
perception of the OPC as liberator overshadows the excesses of the organisation
such as confrontations with security operatives, including the burning down of a
police station and killing of police officers, an incident that made the former
president at one point order security operatives to shoot on sight anybody that
claimed to be a member of the OPC. Another aspect is the use of the name of the
organisation to intimidate and extort money from gullible members of the public,
a problem recognised by both Faseun (2008) and Adams (2008). The transforma-
tion of the OPC has established its viability and relevance in spite of the fact that
the issue of access to the presidency by aYoruba man has been resolved.
The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB)
MASSOB was formed on 13 September 1999 to actualise the Biafran republic by
Chief Ralph Uwazurike, an Indian-trained lawyer. He claimed that he went to India
to study Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent approach to political struggle to avoid the
replication of 1967–1970 episodes when the initial attempt to create a Biafran state
failed after three years of a gruesome, catastrophic war (Uwazurike 2005). To him,
a Biafran state is necessary because Igbo people are not wanted as full Nigerian
citizens by other ethnic groups in the country. Uwazurike and his followers believe
that the declaration of ‘no victor, no vanquish’ after the war and the programme of
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation (3Rs), which the administration
of GeneralYakubu Gowon launched as a way of reintegrating the Igbo into the fold
of a united Nigeria, was merely rhetorical as no concrete actions were undertaken
to accomplish those objectives (Onuegbu 2008; Uwazurike 2005).
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Nnaemeka Ikpeze agrees with the view that the Igbo race was treated purely as
defeated foes by the military leaders who ruled Nigeria after the war, as most of
them were heroes of the war who fought the Biafrans at the frontline. Marginali-
sation of the Igbo became the keyword throughout the dispensation of military
rule, as they were deliberately disempowered politically, economically, socially,
and militarily (Ikpeze 2000:90).
The clear articulation of these policies has been used wisely by Uwazurike and
MASSOB activists in recruitment campaigns. However, this view is not held by
people of Igbo extraction alone, as other Nigerians such as Wola Adeyemo and
Douglas Oronto share this view. For instance, writing for Tell Magazine, Adeyemo
(2004:18) posits:
Igbo land suffers neglect by the federal government, in the sense that erosion
menace common in the southeast are not checked, nor federal industries
sited in the area coupled with the deliberate policy of non-inclusion in the
power structure of the country.
Douglas Oronto echoes this view:
If you look at Nigeria prior to the civil war, you find that the Igbo occupied
the top echelons of the military, the civil service and so on. But after the war,
they are no where around the cadre of leadership. It took a very long time for
the Igbo to begin to demand for presidency.
(Cited in Adeyemo 2004:12)
Sentiments such as those expressed above are not only held by elderly Igbo people
but have been embraced by Igbo youths who did not witness the Nigerian civil war
but constitute a significant proportion of MASSOB’s membership (Onu 2001).
These points are articulated to sway converts into believing that the marginalisa-
tion of Igbo people in Nigeria is reflected in political power distribution and
control of the allocation of materials and other resources at the centre of the three
dimensions of economic strangulation, politico-bureaucratic emasculation, and
military neutralisation and ostracism. Discussions in MASSOB meetings and
rallies revolve around the hatred of Igbos using examples such as the £20 ceiling
placed on bank lodgements for every Igbo after the war no matter how much a
person had in the bank. This policy was interpreted as a calculated attempt to
neutralise the savings and capacity of the Igbo to rehabilitate and reintegrate into
the Nigerian economy (Amadiume 2000).The suddenwithdrawal of federal troops
that fought Biafran rebels from the east is also viewedwith suspicion.As providing
supplies to the troops could have empowered the local inhabitants, this withdrawal
was interpreted as a means to deny the Igbo an opportunity for economic stimulus.
The timing of the indigenisation policy of the federal government, which trans-
ferred ownership of foreign enterprises to Nigerians, also disfavoured the Igbo
economically as it occurred shortly after the war during a period of acute financial
constraint. This is also cited as part of the marginalisation agenda.
The deficient infrastructural development in Igbo land is cited as the reason for
the mass migration of the Igbo people to other areas of the country for economic
survival. This tendency results from the discrimination against Igbo land in
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locating federal industries and the deprivation of the associated benefits to the area
surrounding such sites. It is also connected to the deliberate neglect of ecological
problems related to soil erosion, which contribute substantially to the loss of
agricultural lands and settlements in Igbo land (see Ikpeze 2000).
Beside the policies that disempowered Igbo people economically, MASSOB
members also express frustration about policies used to effectively exclude them
from economic and political power at the centre. These include the tokenistic
appointment to strategically insignificant positions, marginal presence in admin-
istrative ranks and the headship of ministerial and extra-ministerial departments
and parastatals, the distortions of the federal structure to the disadvantage of the
Igbo-speaking people who have the least number of states and local governments
compared with those of other major tribes and zones in the country, and the
indifferent response of federal authorities and even governments of other states to
uphold the constitutionally inviolable natural residency and citizenry rights of
original Igbo owners concerning the issue of abandoned property.
The aforementioned were issues that concerned numerous Igbo organisations
prior to the return to democratic dispensation in 1999.These issues also formed the
basis of MASSOB’s agitation for secession of Igbo land from the rest of Nigeria.
This is well captured in the words of Cletus Nwazurike (2008), a MASSOB
activist:
Since the civil war, things have never been the same.We have been trying as
we can to get back to our premier position in the First Republic. The Igbo are
marginalised, politically, economically, and socially. The state of infrastruc-
ture in the Igbo area is in a sorry state of dilapidation, we don’t have
adequate representation in federal appointments.
Hopes that these issues would be redressed with the dawn of democracy encour-
aged massive participation of Igbo people in the transition programme that
ushered in the fourth republic democratic dispensation in Nigeria. It was hoped
that the openness and freedom that democracy offers would bring about efforts
aimed at redressing the perceived marginalisation (Onuegbu 2008). For instance,
Ralph Uwazurike, who founded MASSOB, played an active role as a member of
the Obasanjo presidential campaign in 1999, and was hopeful that the civilian
administration would toe a different line from those of the receded military
regimes, but was surprised when the new PDP administration failed to appoint
Igbo people into strategically important ministerial positions or the headship of
security services (Uwazurike 2008).To him, the nonchalant attitude of both federal
and state authorities to bring to justice perpetrators of the Sharia riot of 2000 in
Kaduna and the Miss World riot of 2002 in Kano, was an assault on the psyche of
the Igbo people who were the most seriously affected victims of the riots. This and
other sentiments expressing the alienation and marginalisation of Igbo people in
Nigeria constituted the bedrock upon which MASSOB was formed and sustained
(for an extended articulation of these issues, see Obianyo 2007:7).
MASSOB activists have exploited these sentiments in their drive for member-
ship and support using the strategy of persuasion and education to reach potential
recruits. According to Onuegbu (2008), mobilisation of people is hinged on a
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philosophy of non-violence and non-exodus to avoid replication of what happened
the first time Biafra was declared. To accomplish this, MASSOB started by
organising rallies, marches, and demonstrations in Lagos as a way of creating
awareness before the symbolic flag hoisting ceremony on 22May 2000 inAba that
was referred to as the re-declaration of Biafra. The event marked the first time the
group openly clashed with security operatives who were awed by the huge crowd
that attended. That incident was a turning point for MASSOB and the government,
which had to change its perception of the group from rabble-rousers to a potential
security threat.
Beside activities that were aimed at awakening the consciousness of Igbo
people, MASSOB activists had internationalised the struggle and succeeded in
winning international support. Topmost of these strategies was seeking support of
Igbo people in the diaspora, which paid off as manifested in the number of affiliate
organisations abroad such as the Biafran Actualization Forum (BAF) and the
Biafran Liberation Front (BLF). MASSOB collaborated with these groups to
establish a short wave radio station, ‘Voice of Biafra International’, based in
Washington, D.C. and London; a cable television programme, ‘T.V. Biafra’, which
broadcast every Saturday on Channel-Faith Intelcat 10; and a functional website
(http://www.biafraland.com) that propagates the groups’ activities and philosophy.
The organisation has also established offices abroad with the support of these
affiliates, including the Biafra House in Washington, D.C. and Senegal. The
recognition of Biafra as one of the unrepresented nations in 2000 by the United
Nations was achieved through a MASSOB campaign. Other international groups
have cited the heavy hand of state repression against MASSOB as a reason behind
such support. The Centre forWorld Indigenous Studies (CWIS), which recognised
MASSOB and the demand for Biafra in 2006, is one such group (CWIS 2006).
However, there is no open support from sovereign states even though the group has
launched a Biafran international passport for its members. The arrest of Chief
Ralph Uwazurike when he attempted uninvited to attend the 2001 African Union
Summit of Heads of States and Government held in Cotonou attests to this lack of
support.
Taking a cue from the OPC in the west, MASSOB has attempted to garner a
positive public reputation through the provision of social services in Igbo land.
Some of these activities include the interception of petroleum tankers headed to
northern parts of the country and the distribution of such to south-easterners as a
way of redressing what it perceived as injustice to the southeast where fuel
products were selling above the government-prescribed official rate. Uwazurike
justified MASSOB members’ interception of petroleum tankers heading to the
northern parts of the country on the basis of the necessity of correcting the
marginalisation of the Igbo area. Those incidents, which took place at the height of
the fuel scarcity in 2004, attracted the wrath of security operatives who swooped
on MASSOB members perpetrating such acts.
MASSOB has also attempted to forcefully remove the National Association of
Road Transport Organization (NARTO), which it sees as parasitic, from motor
parks in Onitsha. The resistance put up by NARTO led to violent clashes. The
anarchy that resulted in those clashes formed the basis under which the Anambra
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state government prohibited both MASSOB and NARTO from operating in the
state. The government had to order a deployment of a joint security task force
comprising the military and police on strict instruction ‘to shoot on sight’ any
individual that claimed membership of any of these organisations. MASSOB
officials claimed that the organisation lost about seven hundred of its members in
Onitsha as a result of the task force’s enforcement of this order (Onuegbu 2008).
Despite its claims of non-violence, MASSOB’s violent inclination was glaring
during the 2006 census exercise in Nigeria. MASSOB activists who opposed the
exercise in Igbo land forcefully stopped officials of the National Population
Commission (NPC) from carrying out their duties. Those actions attracted the
attention of security operatives who confrontedMASSOB throughout the duration
of that exercise.
Another provocative action of the organisation that has irked the government is
the re-introduction of the former Biafran republic currencies, which were circu-
lating nationally and internationally as a medium of exchange. The use of these
monies was more pronounced with MASSOB members, who encouraged the use
of the monies in business transactions. Uwazurike does not see anything illegal
about the circulation of the former Biafran currencies even within the framework
of the Nigerian legal system. To him, it is purely the choice of the parties
transacting business to use whatever medium of exchange acceptable to them
(Uwazurike 2008).
Though MASSOB appears organisationally cohesive, cracks have occasionally
occurred leading to divisions in the organisation. The first sign of division
appeared after the group gained national visibility in 2000 when Uche Okwukwu,
its legal adviser, disagreed publicly with Uwazurike over his style of administra-
tion. Splinter groups such as the Coalition of Biafra Liberation Groups (COBLIG)
and the Biafra Must Be Society (BIAMUBS) broke away from the organisation.
The repressive tactics of security operatives radicalised a section of the MASSOB
membership who believed that the non-violent disposition of Chief Uwazurike
needed to be reconsidered. The inability to resolve that debate within MASSOB
led to the formation of BIAMUBS. Beside ideological misunderstanding and
differing approaches towards achieving an independent Biafran state, access to
materialism, which rests on who controls the organisation, is largely responsible
for these divisions. For instance, COBLIG, which comprises seven groups at home
and two others in the diaspora,1 accused Uwazurike of high-handedness and
misuse of the organisation’s resources for personal gratification, including the
building of the massive edifice called the Freedom House in his hometown of
Okwe, Imo state. Furthermore, they accused the Uwazurike-led group of derailing
the organisation’s efforts and turning into oppressors of the same people they
purportedly strove to liberate (Okonkwo 2008).
Comparison of the OPC and MASSOB
The inadequacies of the Nigerian state gave rise to both the OPC and MASSOB
(Adejumobi 2002). Grievances against the state, which stem from the perception
of marginalisation and injustice, incubated the condition for recruits into both
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organisations (Awodiya 2006; Reno 1999). The structures of the two organisations
are substantially similar, though there are differences in their style of organisation
and strategy. The OPC is more daring and violently oriented compared to
MASSOB. MASSOB employs more subtle tactics given its philosophy of non-
violence, even though some of its actions are violent.
While still relatively cohesive, divisions exist in both organisations. However,
the factionalisation of the OPC was much more notorious than that of MASSOB.
The divisions in both organisations stem from the management and distribution of
economic booty and not necessarily from ideological rhetoric often parroted by the
leaders in public. The potential of opening up access to economic gains for anyone
controlling either of the two organisations engendered the leadership tussle facing
both organisations (Faseun 2008; Onuegbu 2008). Despite this, the rating of the
two organisations in terms of cohesion remains very strong (Duruji 2009; Nolte
2004). This is attributed to the dynamism of the leadership of the two organisa-
tions. Before he founded the OPC, Dr Faseun had national leadership exposure
unlike Uwazurike of MASSOB, who had neither national nor regional name
recognition before he founded MASSOB except for the leadership of a social club
called the Igbo Council of Chiefs in Lagos. What is common between them is the
fact that the two founders were schemed out of the power equation and so the
formation of the two organisations was an attempt to redefine the power configu-
ration in the country. Faseun was a participant in the political process of the 1990s
as a presidential aspirant under the Social Democratic Party (SDP) before he was
banned by the military administration of General Babangida from further partici-
pation. Uwazurike, on the other hand, was a member of the Peoples Democratic
Party’s (PDP) presidential campaign organisation for the former president Oluse-
gun Obasanjo in 1999 but was dissatisfied with the direction of the Obasanjo
administration after his victory. As such, the explanation of instrumentalists is
more apt to this phenomenon of violence-oriented ethnic organisation in Nigeria
as exemplified by MASSOB and the OPC.
The nature of the relationship both organisations have with their publics to
some extent impacted the way the government relates to them. The solid support
the OPC enjoys from both Yoruba masses and elites accounts for the govern-
ment’s more tolerable stance on the organisation in spite of its excesses and
notorieties as compared to MASSOB, which does not enjoy support of main-
stream Igbo elites and has received a more repressive response from security
operatives. Faseun’s background and exposure contributed significantly to create
the kind of relationship the OPC had with Yoruba elites unlike MASSOB, whose
leader has rebuffed attempts by some Igbo elites to repackage the organisation
to serve as a social pressure group in the mould of the OPC. Furthermore, the
OPC has gained footing in Yoruba land given the populist social services the
organisation renders (Fabiyi 2004). MASSOB’s attempt at rendering social serv-
ices in Igbo land has not been that effective as indicated by the clash with
NARTO in Onitsha.
It is also of note that the government’s repressive response against the two
organisations has been counterproductive. The actions of security operatives,
instead of curbing the activities of these organisations, has resulted in radicalising
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them and forcing them to turn more violent as exemplified in the formation of
BIAMUBS, which does not share the non-violent, non-exodus philosophy of
MASSOB, and the emergence of the Chief GaniAdams faction of the OPC, which
has had numerous clashes with the police. Besides that, the government is ham-
strung in the use of repressive strategies given the democratic dispensation that
demands adherence to rule of law and human rights, thus creating an environment
that encourages both MASSOB and the OPC to thrive.
Conclusion
Ethnic struggle and self-determination are creations of society.The case of Nigeria
is basically fuelled by the perverted nature of the Nigerian state. The concentration
of enormous power and resources at the centre leaves little room at the federating
units, thus making the centre too attractive. The attraction to control the centre
creates the condition of politics in which elites organised on ethnic lines compete
fiercely for power at the centre. The zero-sum nature of Nigerian politics makes
feelings and perceptions of marginalisation inevitable for members of the ethnic
groups that are edged out of power. This forms the basis of mobilisation by the
elites desperate to wrest power or retain it, which in turn generates animosity and
mistrust among the general public.
Recognising this significant problem, attempts have been made to reduce these
centrifugal forces through policies aimed at giving every group a sense of belong-
ing. But instead of abating, ethno-nationalism has intensified in the country
because those efforts at most are perceived as tokenistic. The unwillingness of the
managers of the Nigerian state to boldly confront these issues openly through
dialogue has made them seem permanent. It is rather the repressive response of the
government to ethnic agitations that has given room for conflagration of ethnic
grievances in the country. The non-tolerance of ethnic agitation and the use of
repressive tactics has also given rise to the radicalisation of ethnic struggles as
manifested in the emergence of MASSOB and the OPC.
Therefore the onus lies more with the government to mitigate this phenomenon.
While less emphasis should be placed on repressive tactics in the management of
ethno-nationalism, serious attention should be given to efforts at reforming the
state to meet the needs of an ethnically diverse society. This can only be achieved
through genuine discussion and open debate in a democratic environment.
Ethnicity and its associated complications are firmly rooted in African society.
Because ethnicity is so deeply entrenched into the fabric of the Nigerian political
system, any solution must accommodate the reality of ethnic relationships and
identities. For this accommodation to be found there must be a constitutional
review in the mould of a sovereign national conference to address the structural
imbalance in the Nigerian federation and resolve issues of resource control that
have continued to ferment ethno-nationalism. The present structure allows some
ethnic groups to become powerful while marginalising others. It also provides
elites a tool to manipulate ethnicity for parochial interests. Therefore, reformation
of the state must devolve power to the communities. This will make government
more accountable and encourage greater participation by individuals and civil
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society groups in the political process such that ethnicity can be de-emphasised or
mobilised for positive development.
Note
1 These groups are the Eastern Peoples Congress (EPC), Movement for Igbo Defence
(MID), Eastern Mandate Union (EMU), Popular Front for the Development of Igbo Land
(PFDIL), Biafra Liberation Group (BLG), Ohazurume Ndi Igbo (ONI), Eastern Solidarity
Forum (ESF), Biafra Human Right (BHR) Germany, and Ekwenche Ndi Igbo (ENI) USA.
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